If a vendor is breached

If a cloud vendor is breached, they hold the cookie stores. That is the sentence their blogs bury under “enterprise-grade encryption” and a status page. A product that syncs your profiles is a second custodian. When that custodian’s disk is copied, your sessions are in the copy.

Local disk is the contrast, not a magic shield. This page is the custody story. It sits in Privacy because a breach is a who-has-the-files question before it is a brand question.

What a cloud breach actually copies

Live Chromium trees, cookie databases, localStorage, extension data, maybe proxy credentials, maybe a roster of teammates who could launch the same session. Encryption at rest on their side helps against a stolen idle disk. It helps less against a compromised app server that can decrypt for customers.

What a cloud browser is and cloud browser risk are the architecture. This page is the incident. Extensions in a rented profile are in the same tar.

What a local breach actually copies

Your laptop, your backup drive, your Windows user. MaskWright encrypts profiles.json (AES-256-GCM). The user-data dirs are not encrypted by our code. BitLocker, a strong Windows PIN, and not emailing folders are the controls. We cannot remote-wipe you. We also cannot dump you from a locker we do not have.

What leaves this machine is the short network list: updater, ads, geo. That list is not a profile warehouse. Update channel habits is how you take packages. Downloads discipline is the CSV next to the cookies. Why we dropped bandwidth sharing is so a breach of us is not also a breach of your last mile as inventory.

A local incident I actually plan for: laptop stolen from a car. BitLocker on. Windows PIN not 1234. MaskWright store on that volume. Proxy passwords in encrypted profiles.json. Cookie trees still sitting there once the volume is unlocked. Remote-wipe via Microsoft account if you set that up. We cannot wipe it for you. Change site passwords from a second device. Assume cookies are burned if the PIN was weak.

A cloud incident looks like a status page and a “we encrypted at rest” paragraph. You still rotate every login that lived in their browser. You still wonder how many snapshots exist. Local at least makes the copy-count a number you can guess: this PC, this backup disk, this USB you forgot.

Do not add extra copies by emailing the folder “so I have it in Gmail.” That is a third custodian named Google.

Pushback I hear: “they are SOC2.” A report is not an access log of your cookies. If they can render the session, they can copy the session. Local means the copy-count is your PC and your backups. Plan those. Do not add Gmail as a third custodian by mailing the folder.

FAQ

Are you saying cloud vendors will be breached?

I am saying custody is the product. Plan as if a copy exists wherever the runtime lives.

What if MaskWright.com ads wrappers are compromised?

Dashboard iframes are a web problem. They are not your Seller Central cookie store sitting in our S3. Still patch. Still treat the operator UI as a browser.

Should I stop using any vendor?

No. Use platforms’ own roles. Use a proxy you paid for. Just do not add an extra cookie landlord without a reason. Download MaskWright if the reason was “I did not want that landlord.”

Local is one fewer custodian. It is not immortality. Know who can tar the session. In 0.1, that is you.